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In the United States today, a substantial majority of 
economists agrees that some or all of the task of 
determining exchange rates should be left to private 
markets. The notion seems to be that basic or funda-
mental factors determine equilibrium relative prices of 
currencies—that is, exchange rates — in much the 
same way that tastes, technology, and endowments 
interact in markets to determine equilibrium relative 
prices for other things. 
If there is any disagreement, it seems to be only 
about whether some government intervention is desir-
able in order to keep actual exchange rates close to the 
equilibrium exchange rates supposedly determined by 
fundamentals. Interventionists claim that speculation 
plays an important role in foreign exchange markets, 
one that at times prevents exchange rates from attain-
ing even approximately their equilibrium values. Non-
interventionists respond by turning my title into a 
challenging question. Why, they ask, are markets for 
foreign exchange different from other markets? Pre-
sumably, there is speculation whenever views about 
future prices affect current demands and supplies and, 
hence, current prices. Such speculation is pervasive. 
Can it be established that there is more speculation in 
foreign exchange markets than in other markets? And 
even if that could be established, could the desirability 
of government intervention depend on the amount of 
speculation? In the view of noninterventionists, such a 
conclusion runs counter to invisible-hand propositions. 
These depend for their validity only on general quali-
*This is a revised version of a talk presented at a seminar at the University 
of Minnesota. I am indebted to colleagues at the University and at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, especially Arthur Rolnick, for helpful com-
ments. The ideas expressed were developed jointly by John Kareken and me 
(1978a, b). [Author names and years refer to the works listed at the end of this 
paper.] 
tative assumptions. They do not depend on whether 
there is little or much speculation. 
Thus, there seems to be a certain consistency in 
the view of noninterventionists. If currencies are very 
much like other things, then why, indeed, not let 
private markets determine their relative prices? But 
today's currencies are not like other things. Because of 
this, the noninterventionist view is fallacious—and 
more seriously flawed than even interventionists have 
suggested. 
The objects traded in today's foreign exchange 
markets are fiat currencies. In particular, currencies 
now are not tied to different weights of gold or other 
metals. Economists have long known and agreed that 
fiat currencies are very special objects, not at all like 
other things. What they seem not to have recognized is 
that this specialness tells us why markets in foreign ex-
change are different, qualitatively, from other markets. 
For fiat currencies, there are no inherent funda-
mentals that determine equilibrium exchange rates. 
Without binding legal restrictions on asset holdings that 
prevent one currency from being substituted for another 
either directly or indirectly via international borrowing 
and lending, demands for different currencies are 
determined not in part by speculation, but entirely by 
speculation. One consequence is an indeterminacy 
proposition: Without government intervention in 
foreign exchange markets and without binding re-
strictions on currency holdings, exchange rates, price 
levels, and in general all prices are indeterminate. A 
closely related consequence is that the fixed rate-float-
ing rate dichotomy is inadequate both for descriptive 
analysis and for policy analysis. When exchange rates 
are not fixed, a crucial role is played either by legal 
restrictions on asset holdings or by anticipated govern-
1 ment intervention. These are the only forces that de-
termine exchange rates when rates are not explicitly 
fixed, and these are not comparable to the fundamen-
tals that determine prices in other markets. A so-called 
laissez-faire floating rate monetary system does not 
give rise to a determinate equilibrium, let alone to one 
to which invisible-hand conclusions apply. 
These assertions follow from postulates about fiat 
currencies. As we will see, these postulates and their 
implications make clear why one goes badly astray by 
reasoning about the international monetary system 
from an analogy between fiat currencies and other 
objects like apples, oranges, and shares in General 
Motors. 
Postulates: The Nature of Fiat Currencies 
I will take as postulates three generally accepted 
properties of any fiat currency: 
1. It is intrinsically useless. 
2. It is unbacked. 
3. It is costless to produce. 
The first postulate says that a fiat currency is 
never wanted for its own sake. One person gives up 
goods—leisure or other objects that are wanted per 
se— for some amount of the fiat currency only because 
the person expects to be able subsequently to exchange 
the currency for goods. Put somewhat differently, this 
postulate says that there is only an indirect or derived 
demand for fiat currency; it is wanted only to the extent 
that it makes possible future consumption. 
The second postulate says that the issuer of a fiat 
currency does not promise to exchange it for any other 
object. From the point of view of the issuer, a unit of 
fiat currency is a claim on no more than a fresh piece of 
the same thing. As has always been recognized, it is 
this postulate that distinguishes fiat money from com-
modity money and from other assets like shares in 
General Motors; the issuer of a fiat currency does not 
promise to pay the bearer now or in the future an 
amount of gold or a dividend or anything else. 
The third postulate is simply a convenient way to 
express the idea that a fiat currency is an object whose 
value in exchange exceeds the marginal cost of produc-
ing another unit of it. 
These postulates cast doubt on the analogy that 
advocates of floating rates use to support their view: 
Since private markets can price apples in terms of 
oranges, they can price one currency in terms of 
another. Neither apples nor oranges nor shares in 
General Motors satisfy the above postulates. 
Supplies of Fiat Currencies 
The second and third postulates — that fiat currency is 
unbacked and is costless to produce—have well-
known and almost unanimously accepted implications 
for the provision or supply of fiat currencies: Their 
provision cannot be left to the market. More precisely, 
one cannot allow for free entry into the provision of fiat 
currency. Indeed, leading advocates of floating ex-
change rates, such as Milton Friedman, have long 
espoused this view: 
Some external limit must be placed on the volume 
of a fiduciary [that is, fiat] currency in order to 
maintain its value. Competition does not pro-
vide an effective limit, since the value of the 
promise to pay, if the currency is to remain 
fiduciary, must be kept higher than the cost of 
producing additional units. The production of a 
fiduciary currency is, as it were, a technical 
monopoly, and hence, there is no such presump-
tion in favor of the private market as there is when 
competition is feasible.
1 
This widely accepted implication for the supplies 
of fiat currencies makes clear that the analogy between 
fiat currencies and other things is far from complete. 
For most objects, supplies and demands can be deter-
mined in a free market, one in which neither supply nor 
demand is regulated. For fiat currencies, most econo-
mists agree that supplies must be regulated and that, at 
most, demands can be left unregulated. 
Demands for Fiat Currencies 
The United States has recently issued a new coin: the 
Susan B. Anthony dollar. The sense in which free-
market or unregulated demands for fiat currencies are 
determined entirely by speculation can be seen by 
considering how the market would price Anthonys in 
terms, say, of Lincolns ($5 bills) in different circum-
stances. 
Suppose that an Anthony had no numeral on it, 
just a picture. If the government says that now and in 
the future it stands ready to exchange five Anthonys 
for one Lincoln and vice versa, then the Anthony 
becomes a "one," even though there is no numeral on 
1 Friedman 1960, p. 7. 
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Anthonys and Lincolns outstanding today and that the 
government says that starting in June 1980 and there-
after it will exchange five Anthonys for one Lincoln 
and vice versa. Will five Anthonys still exchange for 
one Lincoln? Our postulates dictate an affirmative 
answer. If not, then the rates of return from now until 
June 1980 on Lincolns and Anthonys would have to 
differ, and that would violate the first fiat currency 
postulate—that currency is intrinsically useless. In 
other words, the announced future exchange ratio is 
today's market exchange ratio. And, so long as the 
announcement is believed, it does not matter whether 
the date at which exchanges are offered is June 1980, 
June 1982, or June 1988. 
This is not true for apples and oranges, or for 
shares in GM and shares in Chrysler. While the 
government could readily make effective any exchange 
ratio between Anthonys and Lincolns, it would have 
some trouble doing that for apples and oranges or for 
shares in GM and shares in Chrysler. Even if that 
difficulty is ignored, the future exchange ratio is only 
one of the influences on the current relative price of the 
fruits or the shares. For apples and oranges, the 
influence of the future exchange rate is limited by the 
fact that apples and oranges are wanted per se, for 
eating and so forth. For shares in GM and shares in 
Chrysler, its influence is limited by the fact that there 
are dividend streams. For Anthonys and Lincolns, 
there are no such fundamentals to help determine the 
current relative price. 
The most startling difference between Anthonys 
and Lincolns, on the one hand, and the fruits or the 
shares, on the other hand, is what happens when no 
future exchange ratio is announced. In the case of 
apples and oranges or of shares in GM and shares in 
Chrysler, a current exchange ratio is determined with-
out any government help. But what about Anthonys 
and Lincolns? For simplicity, suppose that there are 
fixed and unchanging quantities of the two. Even in 
this simple case, it is absurd to suppose that funda-
mental factors could guide the market to find an 
equilibrium exchange rate. Is it less absurd to suppose 
that an unfettered market could find an exchange rate 
between German marks and Lincolns? 
That it is no less absurd is the content of the 
indeterminacy proposition to which we now turn. That 
proposition explains why a floating rate system with 
unregulated demands for fiat currencies is, to put it 
mildly, unworkable. 
Indeterminacy Under Laissez-Faire 
Floating Rates 
For simplicity, let there be two countries and two 
currencies, the supplies of which at time t are given and 
denoted by Mx(t) and M2(t). (As the reader will see, 
the generalization to any number of countries and 
currencies is trivial.) I will argue that in the absence of 
government intervention in exchange markets and in 
the absence of legal restrictions on asset holdings — for 
example, restrictions on who may hold and use what 
currency—there is indeterminacy. I will do this by 
arguing that if there is an equilibrium for any positive 
and unchanging exchange rate, then there is an equi-
librium for any other positive and unchanging exchange 
rate. 
Given the paths of the individual currencies, we 
may define a world currency supply, denoted M(t), by 
M(t) = M{(t) + RM2(t), where R is some positive and 
unchanging exchange rate. Clearly, then, different 
values of R imply different paths of the world currency 
supply, M(t). The argument that any of these paths 
generates an equilibrium if any one of them does has 
two ingredients. First, any unchanging exchange rate, 
R, and our second postulate imply that the rate of 
return on one currency is equal to the rate of return on 
the other in every period. Second, although different 
values of R imply different paths of the world currency 
supply, these paths are similar in one crucial respect. 
For a wide class of supply paths for the individual 
currencies, the limiting growth rate of the world cur-
rency supply, M(t), does not depend on R. While this 
similarity is enough to yield the indeterminacy result in 
many complete models, the essential ideas are brought 
out by considering the simple case where the individual 
currency supplies are constant over time. 
If the supplies of the individual currencies are 
constant over time, then different values of R imply 
different unchanging world currency supplies. In this 
case, the indeterminacy proposition is simply that if 
there is an equilibrium for one currency supply, then 
there is also an equilibrium for any other currency 
supply. Again, we may quote Friedman: 
[The provision of fiat currency] is a monopoly that 
so far as I know has a unique property — the total 
value to the community of the stock of the monop-
3 oly product is entirely independent of the number 
of units in the stock. For any other item entering 
into economic exchange that I can think of, be it 
shoes or hats or tables or houses or even honorific 
titles, the aggregate value of the stock in terms of 
other goods depends on the number of units in it, at 
least outside some limits. For money, it does not. 
If there are five million pieces of paper, or five 
thousand, or five hundred million, as long as the 
number is relatively stable, the aggregate value is 
the same; the only effect is that each unit sepa-
rately has a smaller or larger value as the case may 
be; that is, prices expressed in terms of the money 
are higher or lower.
2 
But this argument may not seem sufficient. Al-
though different exchange rates imply different world 
currency supplies, they also imply different composi-
tions of it. The larger is R, the greater is the fraction of 
the world currency supply that takes the form of 
currency issued by country two. If the indeterminacy 
proposition is correct, then that fraction can be any-
thing. In particular, for large enoughs, everyone in the 
world—both residents of country one and residents of 
country two—use the currency of country two almost 
exclusively, while for small enough R, the reverse is 
true. Can this really be? 
Why not? First, recall that the rates of return on 
the two currencies are the same. Second, by hypoth-
esis, no legal restrictions prevent residents of one 
country from using the currency of another. In these 
circumstances, why would residents of country one 
prefer their own national currency and residents of 
country two prefer theirs? Could it be because resi-
dents of a particular country prefer the color of or the 
pictorial design on the currency of their own country? 
Such preferences violate the postulate that currency is 
intrinsically useless and, moreover, seem silly. 
Without legal restrictions, there is no reason why 
national borders should determine currency usage. 
Canadian dollars have long circulated in areas of the 
United States that border Canada. That being so, one 
can imagine a much larger use of Canadian currency in 
the United States. For another example, the Bank of 
America recently wanted to offer deposits denominated 
in Japanese currency but was officially discouraged. 
Suppose that this quasi-legal restriction had not been 
imposed. One could then well imagine that Japanese 
currency would circulate in California. And, if in 
California, why not in Nevada and Arizona? Or, to 
take another example, without legal restrictions, can't 
one imagine United States dollars circulating widely in 
Mexico? If questions like these are answered affirma-
tively, as I think they must be, then the fraction of the 
world money supply in a particular form can be 
anything. This implies that the exchange rate is inde-
terminate. Moreover, if the exchange rate is indeter-
minate, then so is the distribution of wealth and, hence, 
in general all prices.
3 
But what should we make of this indeterminacy 
proposition? How do we reconcile it with observations 
on historical episodes in which exchange rates have 
floated? And how do we account for the observation 
that national borders do, in large measure, determine 
currency usage? Moreover, if we accept the indeter-
minacy proposition, what are its policy implications? 
There is, I think, a single route to answers to these 
questions. The indeterminacy proposition is based on 
hypotheses that specify an absence of government 
intervention in exchange markets and/or specify an 
absence of legal restrictions on asset holdings. At least 
some of these hypotheses must be abandoned. 
Non-Laissez-Faire Floating Rate Systems 
Economists have, by and large, approached the posi-
tive analysis of international monetary arrangements 
in terms of a dichotomy: fixed exchange rates or float-
ing exchange rates. The indeterminacy proposition, 
however, says that the floating rate regime is not well-
defined without legal restrictions on asset holdings or 
government intervention. It suggests the following 
approach. When analyzing any situation in which 
exchange rates are not fixed explicitly, try to identify 
the less obvious forms of intervention in exchange 
markets and/or the restrictions on asset holdings that 
could produce a determinate equilibrium. 
One less obvious form of intervention in foreign 
exchange markets was hinted at above. Anticipated 
intervention can play much the same role as actual 
intervention. 
2Friedman 1960, p. 7. 
3For a formal argument and one that establishes the existence of 
equilibria of this sort for constant and nonconstant paths of the individual 
currency supplies, see Kareken and Wallace 1978a. By the way, it is not 
evident that only constant exchange rate paths can be equilibria. I suspect, but 
have not yet shown, that any member of a wide class of random exchange rate 
paths also qualifies as an equilibrium. 
4  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Fall 1979 Two widely cited episodes of so-called floating 
exchange rates are the post-Civil War period in the 
United States when "greenbacks" were not officially 
tied to gold, and the post-World War I period when 
the British pound was not officially tied to gold. One 
common feature of both episodes is that gold converti-
bility was subsequently restored. That being so, it 
seems farfetched to analyze those episodes as if people 
thought at the time that gold convertibility would never 
be restored. Therefore, for these episodes, probable 
future restoration of gold convertibility is a form of 
government intervention that constitutes a departure 
from the hypotheses that produce indeterminacy.
4 
For today's currencies, restoration of convert-
ibility into a commodity seems farfetched. But it is not 
unreasonable to say that post-World War II floating 
rate episodes have been accompanied by anticipated 
intervention if exchange rates wandered too far—too 
far, perhaps, from those that would have prevailed 
under pervasive controls on asset holdings. The inter-
vention may be exchange market intervention by 
countries acting cooperatively or may involve the 
imposition of restrictions on asset holdings which 
makes feasible intervention by a country acting alone. 
Thus, for example, from this point of view, it is 
reasonable to explain the behavior of the U.S. dollar in 
exchange markets over the period August 1971 to 
November 1978 in terms of the U.S. government, with 
the implicit agreement of other countries, "talking 
down" the value of the dollar. It is also understandable 
that some market participants expressed doubts about 
how much had been accomplished in November 1978 
because the U.S. did not impose restrictions on asset 
holdings. 
In fact, today the most obvious and important 
departures from the hypotheses yielding indeterminacy 
are actual or threatened restrictions on capital-account 
transactions. Such restrictions tend to prevent one 
currency from being substituted for another, both 
directly and indirectly by way of international borrow-
ing and lending. To the extent that this is accomplished, 
the indeterminacy disappears. 
There are many instances of actual restrictions on 
asset holdings. (In the case of Israel, both the controls 
on asset holdings and their partial removal in 1977 
have been widely commented on, if not completely 
understood.) Instances of threatened restrictions are 
harder to identify, but can play much the same role as 
actual restrictions. Thus, suppose that the equHibrium 
exchange rate between M{ and M2 would be R in the 
presence of pervasive capital controls, and suppose 
that it is anticipated that any sizable departure of the 
actual exchange rate from R will trigger the imposition 
of pervasive controls. Then, jt can be shown that the 
exchange rate stays close to R.
5 
There is, moreover, a close relationship between 
the role of controls on asset holdings in producing 
determinate exchange rates and the notion that equi-
librium exchange rates are determined by the condition 
that trade be balanced. In order to understand this 
relationship, it is helpful to begin with what economists 
call the barter theory of trade, that part of trade theory 
which analyzes economic connections among countries 
in models that do not contain currencies or, therefore, 
exchange rates. 
It is, by now, well known that trade can be out of 
balance, even permanently, in such barter or non-
monetary models. Essentially, imbalance of trade is 
accompanied by residents of one country being net 
creditors or debtors to residents of other countries, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, by residents of one 
country owning on net more or less than all the assets 
located in their own country.
6 In these nonmonetary 
models, one way to insure trade balance is to rule out 
by law any capital-account transactions, any net bor-
rowing between residents of one country and residents 
of other countries, and any ownership of assets not 
located in the country of residence. As a matter of 
accounting, such a prohibition implies trade balance. 
Now consider a model in which there is a role for 
currency, a model in which there is a demand for 
currency. Again, as a matter of accounting, the imposi-
tion of laws that preclude capital-account transactions 
— and, hence, the ownership by residents of one 
country of currency issued by other countries — implies 
trade balance. It also, as suggested above, implies a 
well-defined demand for the currency issued by the 
Alternatively, one may say that "greenbacks" and post-World War I 
British pounds were not fiat currencies: they violate the second postulate. They 
should be treated as discount bonds that were in (partial) default; holders were 
uncertain both about the date at which each would pay off in terms of gold and 
about the amount of the payoff. 
5For explicit analyses of policy schemes that specify contingent and 
possibly random future intervention and asset-holding restrictions, see Kareken 
and Wallace 1978a and Nickelsburg forthcoming. 
6See Gale 1971, 1974 and Kareken and Wallace 1977. 
5 home country and, hence, a determinate exchange 
rate. But the result that pervasive capital controls 
implies both trade balance and a determinate exchange 
rate is quite different from the fallacious notion that 
trade balance is a natural state of affairs and that an 
equilibrium exchange rate is determined by the condi-
tion that trade be balanced. 
Many readers, I suspect, will argue that this 
discussion overemphasizes restrictions on asset hold-
ings like capital controls at the expense of more subtle 
restrictions like those implied by legal-tender laws. 
While these readers may concede that only legal, non-
laissez-faire restrictions create well-behaved demands 
for individual currencies, they might assert, first, that 
restrictions like legal-tender laws do produce such 
demands, and second, that such restrictions are in 
effect in all countries at all times. That being so, 
they might claim, one is justified in simply assuming 
that there are well-behaved demands for individual 
currencies, whether or not more explicit restrictions 
like capital controls are in effect. I am doubtful. 
First, the pervasiveness of legal-tender laws has 
not seemed to prevent the occurrence of hyperinflations 
during which the fraction of wealth held in the form of a 
particular currency has approached zero. Second, an 
explicit analysis of legal-tender laws—which, by the 
way, would have to recognize that they amount to 
explicit restrictions like a requirement that real tax 
liabilities be paid in the form of a particular currency— 
would suggest that such laws at best imply lower 
bounds on the amount of wealth held in the form of a 
particular currency. So long as the total demand for 
currency in each country exceeds the lower bound 
implied by the country's legal-tender laws, the absence 
of other asset restrictions or intervention implies a 
range of indeterminacy. That the indeterminacy range 
is large is suggested by the fact that most countries 
have at times found it necessary to resort to more 
explicit restrictions on asset holdings. A large indeter-
minacy range is also consistent with the behavior of 
exchange rates and money supplies in many countries 
during the last few years. That behavior cannot be 
easily interpreted in terms of well-behaved demand 
functions for individual currencies. 
Policy Options in a World of 
Many Fiat Currencies 
Noninterventionist advocates of floating rates have 
painted a rosy picture of floating exchange rates. 
6 
Milton Friedman, for instance, asserts that a floating 
rate system can be as free of capital-account and trade 
restrictions as a single currency system: 
The basic fact is that a unified currency and a 
system of freely floating exchange rates are mem-
bers of the same species even though superficially 
they appear very different. Both are free market 
mechanisms for interregional or international pay-
ments. Both permit exchange rates to move freely. 
Both exclude any administrative or political inter-
mediary in payments between residents of different 
areas. Either is consistent with free trade between 
areas, or with a lessening of trade restrictions.
7 
Unfortunately, the picture is a mirage. Friedman's 
claims about freely floating exchange rates rest on the 
notion that without legal restrictions of various kinds 
the demands for individual currencies are well behaved. 
That view, in turn, rests on no more than an analogy 
between currencies and other objects, an analogy that 
we have seen to be faulty. Since freely floating 
exchange rates imply indeterminacy, such an inter-
national monetary system is not an option. The alter-
natives to fixed exchange rates are various kinds of 
implicit intervention schemes and implicit or explicit 
restrictions on asset holdings. 
That these are the options follows from the proper-
ties of fiat currency described above, in particular, 
that fiat currency is intrinsically useless and unbacked. 
The formation of the European Monetary Union is 
consistent with these properties. The predominant 
view in the United States about feasible international 
monetary systems is not. 
Unfortunately, none of the feasible options is 
without drawbacks. As is widely understood, a system 
of cooperatively fixed exchange rates requires that 
national control over currency issue be surrendered. In 
essence, it requires that countries coordinate the degree 
to which they tax by inflation or, in other words, the 
degree to which they finance current expenditures with 
permanent additions to indebtedness. The alternatives, 
though, are also unpleasant. They involve the imposi-
tion of controls on the kinds of assets individuals can 
hold. 
It is becoming widely recognized that the value of 
7Friedman 1968, p. 7. 
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of other currencies are closely related. It is also widely 
recognized that domestic policies in the United States 
— essentially, the degree to which we resort to taxation 
by permanent increases in indebtedness—must be 
brought into line with that of other countries if the U. S. 
dollar is to have a stable value in terms of other 
currencies. What is not widely recognized is that 
coordination of budget policies in this sense is only one 
of the conditions needed to stabilize both the goods 
value and the foreign currency value of the U.S. dollar. 
Without intervention in exchange markets or restric-
tions on asset holdings, indeterminacy prevails. That 
being so, we should at least consider pursuing an 
explicit policy directed toward cooperative and per-
manent exchange market intervention or toward con-
trols on asset holdings. The alternative is to leave 
market participants guessing or speculating about 
future actions of these kinds. 
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